A key feature of insurance markets is that the cost of selling insurance policies is contingent upon not only the number of policies sold but to whom they are sold. This di¤erentiates insurance markets from conventional markets and admits novel strategies, such as segmentation strategies, through which …rms may project market power. This paper clari…es how segmentation strategies di¤er from simple increases in pricing precision, details implications of their use, and provides evidence of their e¤ec-tive utilization. To these ends, a two stage spatial model of Bertrand price competition is speci…ed, with an endogenously determined rule for sharing demand, to identify the consequences of the strategic use of information asymmetries between competing insurance …rms. Two implications of the model's equilibrium are tested against an original dataset, which provides comprehensive pricing and categorization data for the Washington state non-standard private passenger automobile (PPA) insurance market. This unique data set provides the …rst opportunity to test for segmentation strategies in a categorically mature insurance market.
Introduction
A key feature of insurance markets is that the cost of selling insurance policies is contingent upon not only the number of policies sold but to whom they are sold. This di¤erentiates insurance markets from conventional markets and admits novel strategies, such as segmentation strategies, through which …rms may project market power. Segmentation strategies consist of two components. First, a …rm must categorize insurance consumers more …nely relative to its competitors. Second, the …rm must set prices across its categorization structure to simultaneously create and exploit its competitors'adverse selection problems. While e¤orts to utilize segmentation strategies are common in some insurance markets, they have never been satisfactorily modeled, nor have markets, where categorization is unfettered, been tested for their presence. When considered at all, segmentation strategies have been modeled in a relatively ad hoc fashion (Buzzacchi and Valletti (2005) , Schwarze and Wein (2005) , and Strauss and Hollis (2007) ). This paper clari…es how segmentation strategies di¤er from simple increases in pricing precision, details implications of their use, and provides evidence of their e¤ective utilization. To these ends, a two stage spatial model of Bertrand price competition is speci…ed, with an endogenously determined rule for sharing demand, to identify the consequences of the strategic use of information asymmetries between competing insurance …rms. Two implications of the model's equilibrium are tested against an original data set, which provides comprehensive pricing and categorization data for the Washington state nonstandard private passenger automobile (PPA) insurance market. This unique data set provides the …rst opportunity to test for segmentation strategies in a categorically mature insurance market.
The e¤ective use of segmentation strategies depends on information asymmetries between …rms, i.e., variation in the capacity of …rms to discern the expected cost of entering into insurance contracts. Advantaged …rms, those relatively adept at perceiving cost di¤erentiation, are able to categorize and price consumers with more precision than disadvantaged …rms. However segmentation strategies cannot be characterized solely as increases in pricing precision. By elevating the price of insurance in high cost categories and retaining the original market price in low cost categories, the advantaged …rm is able to alter the distribution of business between …rms. Disadvantaged …rms end up insuring a greater proportion of high cost consumers, which compels them to raise rates. Consequently, the advantaged …rm is able to isolate consumers in its newly de…ned low cost categories and price above marginal cost even as free entry and other competitive forces promote marginal cost pricing in the high cost market segments. Given that intense competition exists in high cost market segments and that the use of segmentation strategies does not depend on the level of market concentration, this type of anticompetitive behavior is di¢ cult to identify by standard measures of competition. Furthermore, segmentation strategies unambiguously reduce consumer welfare and provide a new explanation of anomalous features of insurance markets such as price dispersion and premium in ‡ation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides mo-tivation. The model is developed in section 3, …rst laying out a general speci…cation of the model and then proving existence of equilibrium for both the compulsory and noncompulsory insurance cases. Section 4 gives a characterization of equilibrium, then brie ‡y analyzes some comparative statics of interest, and concludes with a discussion of the welfare e¤ects. Section 5 provides empirical evidence of segmentation strategies in the Washington non-standard private passenger automobile (PPA) market. Section 6 concludes and suggests future research.
Motivation
The potential for adverse selection and the competitiveness of insurance markets have long been of interest to economists. Two seminal papers (Akerlof (1970) and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) ) set the theoretical foundation for considering both issues. Standard models of competition in insurance markets (Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) , Wilson (1977) , and Crocker and Snow (1986)) make assumptions that obscure the potential for market power: product homogeneity, free entry limit, and symmetric categorization. Firms compete through the selection of the price and the amount of coverage o¤ered to consumers. Empirical work has generally supported these assumptions in that it has not found prices to be positively correlated with market concentration. Joskow and McLaughlin (1991) …nd that automobile insurance …rms have no signi…cant market power due to strong competitive pressures such as minimal barriers to entry, relatively low industry concentration, and constant returns to scale in production. Subsequent work provides limited evidence of collusive pricing between …rms and shown that reducing regulation leads to more competitive pricing (Barros (1996) and Chidambaran, Pugel, and Saunders (1997)). Thus anticompetitive tactics, if present, in insurance markets must be robust to these competitive pressures. Several features of PPA insurance markets are di¢ cult to reconcile with this competitive model. First, policy limits in markets for insurance like PPA, are relatively standardized and do not appear to be an active dimension in competition. Second, there is signi…cant price dispersion evident in PPA markets. 1 This is surprising given insurance expenditures tend to be large relative to disposable income and thus should exhibit relatively low price dispersion (Pratt, Wise, and Zeckhauser (1979) ). One explanation for the price dispersion are search costs. Brown and Goolsbee (2002) show that price dispersion declined in the US life insurance market as the internet made it easier to compare prices, but signi…-cant price dispersion remained and the evidence does not show that search costs are the primary force underlying price dispersion. Finally, symmetric categorization is far from apparent PPA insurance. 2 There exists a signi…cant level of di¤erentiation in pricing and categorization structures across …rms in many insurance markets. Table A6 summarizes divergence in the categorization structure for three …rms in the Washington PPA market at the beginning and end of the seven years analyzed in this paper. Also, data collected from the Washington PPA insurance market and summarized in table A5 provides evidence suggestive of signi…cant variation in categorization over many dimensions, e.g., the use of credit information in rating and the variation in discounts o¤ered.
The symmetry assumption has recently begun to be explored the insurance literature. Buzzacchi and Valletti (2005) present model where categorization is a choice variable. Matching a competitor's categorization is shown to be a dominant strategy for …rms and the equilibrium predicts symmetry in categorization strategies. This result depends on two assumptions: the cost of utilizing rating variables and the ability to categorize on the basis of expected cost with those variables is equal across …rms. Although these are reasonable assumptions, there is no evidence that the cost of incorporating innovative techniques into pricing strategies and the ability to do so is uniform across …rms. There is a paucity of analysis regarding innovation in insurance categorization leaves then nature of innovation and iits di¤usion across …rms an open question. Data from the Washington PPA insurance market show that …rms diverge considerably in categorization, e.g., even methods of categorizing which are easily copied, such as garaging address, show signi…cant variation. 3 Strauss and Hollis (2007) examine the impact of an advantage in categorization due to a technological advance that is di¢ cult to replicate. Examples of such an innovation are the recent development of GPS tracking and the use of credit reports to categorize and price drivers in PPA markets. While the data from the Washington non-standard PPA market were collected before the use of GPS tracking, credit information, generally regarded by insurers as a powerful rating variable, has been slow to spread since its introduction in the early 90's. In 1999, only 27% of …rms used credit to categorize; by 2005 that number increased to only 55%.
However, much of the observable variation is not likely di¢ cult to adopt. Several factors serve to explain why …rms do not categorize symmetrically. First, …rms use data on past business to estimate the impact of new rating strategies. Given the historical mix of business, …rm's in-house data may re ‡ect bias inherent in past business that obscures (or makes irrelevant in the case of niche providers) the value of some rating variables. Potential sources for this type of bias include the past competitive climate, amount of past business written, managerial determination of the data to be collected, and the ability/clout to collect the desired information. Second, di¤erences follow from variation in the organizational design of …rms, e.g., Progressive Insurance is structured to collect and mine data to aggressively improve the competitiveness of its rating structure, while other …rms passively rely on ISO data. Third, observing a competitor's categorization strategy is not su¢ cient for a …rm to incorporate and the minimum was 239,752.
elements of that strategy into its own pricing scheme. Beyond understanding of how a rating variable is correlated with other variables in one's own rating scheme, often aspects of rating techniques are proprietary and hidden from competitors. Even when the methods a competitor uses are visible, simply copying a competitor's strategy may not be viable due to di¤erences between the …rms underwriting practices, technological capability, modes of distribution, and other …rm heterogeneities. Testing to identify the particular reasons for divergence in categorization is beyond the scope of this paper. The project here is to determine whether the data are consistent with the e¤ective use of segmentation strategies, which implies asymmetries in categorization ability across …rms.
With respect to adverse selection, the literature's focus has been on the information asymmetry between an insured and the insurer, where the insured has private information about his riskiness than the insurer. In equilibrium, the amount of insurance purchased is positively correlated with the insured's risk type. Subsequent empirical work has provided mixed results with some studies presenting evidence that supports the theoretical models (Puelz and Snow (1994) , Makki and Somwaru (2001) , and Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) ) and others where evidence appears at odds with the theoretical models (Chiappori and Salanie (2000) and Dionne, Gourieroux, and Vanasse (2001)).
Our focus on adverse selection follows a new strand of literature (Buzzacchi and Valletti (2005) and Strauss and Hollis (2007) ) that focuses on the potential for adverse selection issues arising from categorization di¤erences between …rms. Schwartz and Wien (2005) provide the only empirical analysis of this type of adverse selection. Their analysis of the German PPA market documents an unusual episode where …rms rapidly adopted categorization strategies, long established in other markets, following the deregulation of strict categorization restrictions. Their …ndings indicate that …rms are able to gain categorization advantages that lead to a measurable but temporary decrease in losses. Whether a categorization advantage can be sustained under di¤erent circumstances is unclear. This analysis is the …rst to test for the impact of adverse selection resulting from category di¤erentiation, on losses and market share, in a market that is mature and relatively unfettered in terms of categorization.
The Model
The model focuses on competitive pressures that in ‡uence …rm categorization and pricing decisions. It is assumed that all …rms o¤er policies that provide full insurance and so quantity/policy limits are not a dimension of competition. 4 The advantaged …rm (…rm 1) is the only …rm endowed with the ability to discern the expected cost of consumers, and so is the only …rm capable of pricing according a consumer's categorical designation. This is modeled by the ability of …rm 1 to partition the market into segments and separately price each segment. Firms 2 and 3, unable to distinguish between consumers, are limited to setting one price for the entire market. The expected cost of insuring a consumer chosen at random from the market and any of its segments is common knowledge.
Timing of Moves
The game consists of two stages as depicted in Figure 1 . In the …rst stage …rm 1 partitions the market and sets a price for each segment of the market. At the beginning of the second stage …rms 2 & 3 move simultaneously, each choosing one price for the entire market. Payo¤s are realized at the end of the second stage. 
Consumers
The demand side of the market consists of a continuum of consumers whose distribution over the interval [0; q] is given by the non-atomistic probability distribution function f (q). Consumers face the possibility of two states of the world: no loss (t = 0) or loss (t = 1). For any consumer q 2 [0; q], the consumer's wealth is W 0 = W in the no loss state and W 1 = W L in the loss state. W denotes initial wealth and L denotes the loss where W L > 0. W and L are constant and identical for all consumers. Let q be consumer q's probability of a loss, where q 2 [ ; ] and > > 0. Consumers are organized in order of increasing probability of the loss state q . Given these foundations, for any con…guration of the 's expected cost of insuring any consumer q can be represented by a weakly increasing function C : [0; q] ! R + .
Consumers have identical preferences over wealth in the possible states characterized by the expected utility function V ( ; W; L) = (1 )U (W 0 ) + U (W 1 ), where U 00 (W ) < 0. Insurance contracts are made available to consumers at a premium level P i , where i indexes the …rm. When insurance is not compulsory, consumer q buys insurance if and only if 9P i such that
Consumers are limited to purchasing one contract each. Finally, it is assumed that V ( ) and the 's are such that all consumers will choose to insure at a price equal to the expected cost of insuring the average consumer in the market:
Firms
The supply side of the market consists of 3 homogeneous risk neutral …rms indexed by i, each o¤ering full insurance policies. A strategy for …rm 1 consists of choosing a categorical division and setting prices P 1l and P 1h for each newly de…ned segment. Firm 1's selection of 2 [0; q] partitions the continuum of consumers into two market segments. Let m 2 fl; h; ag, where l denotes the low cost segment [0; ), h denotes the high cost segment [ ; q], and a denotes the entire market. A consumer categorized in segment m is denoted by q m . Firm 1's strategy is a vector P 1 , where P 1 = ( ; P 1l ; P 1h ) 2 [0; q] R + R + . A strategy for the disadvantaged …rms (i, for i = 2; 3) consists of selecting its price P i 2 R + conditional upon the advantaged …rm's strategy and the simultaneous movement of the other disadvantaged …rm. De…ne P = (P 1 ; P 2 ; P 3 ) to be a strategy pro…le where P 2[0; q] R 2 + R + R + . Each …rm seeks to maximize its payo¤ given by its results function R i : R [0; 1] ! R. The results function for …rm i is simply a lexicographic preference over expected pro…ts, i , and market share, M S i . 6 
The Sharing Rule
Following Simon and Zame (1990) , the sharing rule is endogenized to address existence of equilibrium issues caused by payo¤ function discontinuities common to spatial games with continuous strategy spaces. The endogenization of the sharing rule has three principle e¤ects in this game. First, it guarantees existence of equilibrium in all subgames. Second, while the path of play remains unchanged across admissible sharing rules, the distribution of payo¤s vary. 7 Finally, it allows for a deeper analysis of categorization than is possible with the …nite consumer type approach used in Hollis and Strauss (2007) .
A sharing rule in subgame (P1) is de…ned as, s (P1) = (s 1 ; s 2 ; s 3 ) 2 S, where
. From here on s will be used for s (P1) , where the subgame is clear from the context. In the case of a three way tie, the share …rm i receives of the segment is s i . If two …rms, i and j, tie …rm i receives the share s 6 This assumption is rather weak as it is analogous to assuming that a …rm prefers to price at marginal cost rather than price itself out of the market in a standard Bertrand pricing game . 7 The basic results of this paper are robust to this variation with the caveat for some extreme sharing rules and cost functions, the ordering of market share may vary. j, where s i = s j = 0, it is assumed that the …rms split the segment evenly. A sharing rule that does not yield existence of equilibrium for a subgame is deemed inadmissible and is excluded from the set of potential sharing rules for that subgame.
Subgames
The full game can be de…ned as = (f1; 2; 3g; fP i g i=1;2;3 ; fR i ( i ; M S i )g i=1;2;3 ), where the timing of the game is as outlined above. A proper subgame of consists of the second stage simultaneous play of the disadvantaged …rms, conditional upon …rm 1's action in the …rst stage of the game and the sharing rule s. An example of a subgame can be seen in Figure 2 , where price is measured on the vertical axis and consumers are measured on the horizontal axis. Firms 2 and 3 simultaneously make their pricing decisions taking the categorization, , and Firm 1's prices, P 1l and P 1h , as given. De…ne (P1) = (f2; 3g; fP i g i=2;3 ; fR i ( i (P; s); M S i (P; s))g i=2;3 ) to be a proper subgame game. There is a unique proper subgame associated with each element of …rm 1's strategy space. In the following, the strategy P 1 is used as shorthand for (P1) , the subgame that follows the play of P 1 in the …rst stage. 
Demand and Cost functions
De…ne the set of consumers from segment m that will purchase insurance given P to be:
In the compulsory insurance case d m (P) = m; 8 m; 8P . However, in the more general case where insurance is voluntary, consumers may be priced out of the segment such that for some P, d m (P) m. Let the lowest probability consumer to demand insurance given prices P be denoted by:
All consumers in market segment m with q s.t. q > q m will also purchase insurance, consequently the total demand for insurance by consumers in segment m at prices P can be represented as q m = q m q m , where q l = and q h = q. Figure 3 provides an illustration of the demand for insurance by segment for category break and prices P 1l and P 1h .
For any s and , demand for …rm i in market m given the strategies of the other …rms j, and k is given by the following:
Figure 3 -Demand when insurance is non-compulsory.
Total demand for …rm i is given by the summation of the demand for …rm i's product over both market segments, M = fl; hg:
For any P, the expected cost function C(q) with …ve key values:
1. The expected marginal cost of insuring the lowest risk consumer: C= C(0)
2. The expected marginal cost of insuring a consumer selected from the entire market:
The expected marginal cost of insuring a consumer selected from segment l:
The expected marginal cost of insuring a consumer selected from segment h: For the non-compulsory case, it is important to distinguish between the expected cost of insuring an individual in segment m when all or a fraction of consumers choose to insure. Let C m be shorthand for C m (P), when d m (P) = m, while C m (P) will be used when prices may in ‡uence demand such that d m (P) m for l, h, and a.
Given the demand and cost functions, the payo¤ function R i , for …rm i can be fully speci…ed, where each element can be de…ned as follows:
Existence of Equilibrium
The solution concept used to solve the game is Subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium. A solution consists of a strategy pro…le P = (P 1 ; P 2 ; P 3 ) and a sharing rule s (P1) for each subgame (P1) . The following SPNE is the limit of …nite strategy space game (with equal demand sharing between …rms) as the strategy space approaches the continuous strategy space. Theorems 1 and 2 assume insurance is compulsory.
Theorem 1 Given an exogenously set category break 2 (0; q), a pure strategy Subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium exists where the path of play consists of the strategy portfolio P = [( ; C a ; C h ); (C h ; C h ); (C h ; C h )] and the endogenous sharing rule s (P ) = Proof: See appendix.
Remark 1 Categorizing at either of boundary is equivalent to not categorizing and results in the standard Bertrand outcome, P im = C a 8i 8m. To …nd the optimal category break one needs only focus on the payo¤ of the subgame, P 1 = ( ; C a ; C h ), for 2 (0; q).
Remark 2
The equilibrium of theorem 1 is not unique. While P is the same over all equilibria there is an equilibrium for every sharing rule s, where s 1 6 = 0.
Remark 3
The price P 1l = C a serves as a ceiling for the segmenting …rm's price for segment l. Any price set above C a by …rm 1 provides the disadvantaged …rms with the opportunity to undercut P 1l in segment l.
Remark 4
Despite the advantaged …rm's ability to discern each consumers type, a coarse categorization serves to elevate pro…ts. Restricting the advantaged …rm to one category break has little impact on the fundamental characteristics of the equilibrium. The number of category breaks is restricted to one because it is the simplest version that conveys the critical elements of this type of strategic interaction. Additional category breaks lead to one or both of the following outcomes depending on C(q): segment h is treated as a separate market and categorized according to Theorem 2 or segment l is partitioned allowing the advantaged …rm to increase the price above C a (but still constrained by the potential of being undercut) for the riskiest low cost consumers.
Remark 5
Modeling categorization along only one dimension,implicitly assumes that the predictive power of the rating variables used is the same over all …rms.
Relaxing the assumption that is exogenously set, it is of interest to understand how the advantaged …rm will categorize the market. Given the sharing rule assignment in theorem 1, theorem 2 builds on the result of theorem 1.
Theorem 2 There exists a unique results maximizing category break for any cost function C : [0; q] ! R + . If C(q) is such that the set fq j q 2 [0; q] and C(q) = C a g is nonempty, de…ning to be the closure of , then the results maximizing category break is = sup( ). If C : [0; q] ! R + is discontinuous such that there exists no consumer q where C(q) = C a , then that point of discontinuity is the results maximizing category break.
Proof: See appendix.
Remark 6
It follows directly from theorems 1 and 2 that the strategy portfolio P = [( ; C a ; C h ); (C h ; C h ); (C h ; C h )], where = sup( ), and the endogenous sharing rule s = give the path of play for the SPNE of the full game where …rm 1 is free to act on the entire set of choice variables: , P 1l , and P 1h .
Relaxing the assumption that insurance is compulsory has little e¤ect on the model's equilibrium. Theorem 3 is the non-compulsory analog of theorem 1. A characterization of the game when is a choice variable follows as an extension of theorem 2.
Theorem 3 For any exogenously set 2 (0; q). A pure strategy Subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium exists where the path of play consists of the strategy portfolio P = [( ; C a ; C h (P)); (C h (P); C h (P)); (C h (P); C h (P))] and the endogenous sharing rule s (P ) = , where C h (P) is the expected cost of insuring an individual drawn at random from the insureds that remain in segment h at the price P h = C h (P).
Remark 7
When insurance is non-compulsory, the selection of the category break in ‡uences both the actuarially fair price in segment h and whether the least risky consumers in segment h insure
Characteristics of Equilibrium and Welfare
The segmenting equilibrium is robust to features that are usually indicate markets are competitive. However, the model provides several results that can be used to isolate the use of segmentation strategies.
Characterization of Equilibrium
It has been shown in the compulsory case that there exists an equilibrium with the path of play P = [( ; C a ; C h ); (C h ; C h ); (C h ; C h )] and the sharing rule s = . In equilibrium,…rm 1's pro…ts and market share exceed those of the disadvantaged …rms.
Firm 1 earns its pro…ts entirely in segment l where it undercuts its disadvantaged competitors. Segment h is divided between all three …rms at cost, C h . Disadvantaged …rms are free to enter the market segment h, but face certain losses if they seek to price competitively in segment l. Thus, ease of entry, by itself, is not a good indicator of competitive level of an insurance market.
That …rm 1 is able to price and sell insurance above cost in segment l is re ‡ected in its loss ratio. De…ne the equilibrium loss ratio for …rm i to be:
It follows from the equilibrium pro…ts that LR 1 is lower for the advantaged …rm such that, 1 = LR 2 = LR 3 > LR 1 0, where
Firm 1 prices at the low end of the distribution of prices in low cost segments and prices competitively in the high cost segments along its dimension of advantage. Price dispersion, measured as the ratio of the maximum to the minimum price P D m = max(P1m;P2m;P3m) min(P1m;P2m;P3m) , is greater than 1 in equilibrium for segment l since disadvantaged …rms are unable to price segments separately. There is no price dispersion in segment h:
Finally, the average premium level across the entire market, P a is elevated relative to the pre-segmentation actuarially fair price (P a = C a ):
Comparative Statics
Unlike the Stiglitz and Rothschild approach to modeling insurance competition, a continuous distribution is used to characterize variation in consumer risk. This foundation allows for a deeper analysis of market segmentation such as the following three questions. First, how does variation in the concavity of the expected cost function, C(q), in ‡uence the optimal categorization choice and the advantaged …rm's pro…ts? Second, what e¤ect does the inclusion of additional high risk consumers have on the e¤ectiveness of these strategies? And third, how does the optimal category break change as the distribution of consumers becomes skewed?
The location of on the interval (0; q) and the equilibrium price in each segment depend on both C(q) and f (q). The following analysis assumes a cost function of the form C(q; n) = Aq n + b, that is twice continuously di¤erentiable, where A; n > 0, and a uniform probability distribution f (q) = 1 q . The parameter n serves to adjust the concavity of the expected cost function. As n increases from 0, C(q; n) goes from being concave to convex. Proposition 1 addresses how the concavity of the C(q; n) in ‡uences , holding constant the intercept and the expected cost of an individual drawn from the entire market.
Proposition 1 Holding C a , b, and q the distribution f (q) constant, @ @n takes the sign of the expression (n + 1) ln(n + 1) ln(q) n. Given that C(q; n) is convex (concave), the greater that convexity (concavity) the greater (lower) the value of when (n + 1) ln(n + 1) ln(q) n > 0. The reverse holds when (n + 1) ln(n + 1) ln(q) n < 0. Thus, shifts in expected costs and di¤ erences in costs across states can have multiple e¤ ects depending on .
Proof. Take any expected cost function C(q; n) = Ax n + b, where A = (Ca b)(n+1) q n > 0 and b is some positive valued constant. Let f (q) be the uniform distribution over the interval [0; q]. Theorem 1 implies that we only need to consider the set of subgames
Consider an arbitrary sharing rule s, such that s = (s 1 ; s 2 ; s 3 ) where s i 0 8i. The advantaged …rm will face the following pro…t function (where P 1l = C a ) and expression for the pro…t maximizing :
The optimal category break can then be solved for as:
It follows then that the change in the optimal category break can be characterized as:
The …rst two terms are clearly positive, however the last term's sign depends on the values of n and q. Figure 5 graphs two expected cost functions. As n is increased the expected cost function becomes more convex, so the high cost individuals'costs increase relative to the low cost consumers. Given that the expected cost of insuring an individual selected at random from the entire market is C a , if (n + 1) ln(n + 1) ln(q) n > 0 then the optimal category break increases with n. But, if it is C 0 a , then (n + 1) ln(n + 1) ln(q) n < 0 and the category break decreases. The second proposition concerns the impact of expanding the market to include additional high risk consumers, such as legislating coverage of high risk agents. This unambiguously increases the categorical break and the pro…tability of segmentation strategies.
Proposition 2 All other things equal, for any function C(q), an increase in q leads to an increase in the optimal category break and an increase in the advantaged …rm's pro…ts.
Proof. Consider any expected cost function of the form C(q) = Aq n + b. Assuming that P 1l = C a , the pro…ts for any q can be given by the following pro…t function:
It follows that:
Finally, the greater the expected cost of insuring in the high cost segment relative to the low cost segment, the greater reward of segmenting strategies to the advantaged …rm.
Proposition 3 All other things equal, for any strictly increasing function C(q), a shift of the distribution of consumers f (q) towards q (towards 0), the greater (lower) the value of .
Proof. Consider a continuous strictly increasing expected cost function C(q) and a distribution of consumers f (q), de…ned on the interval [0; q]. Along the equilibrium path of play, consumers in the low market will pay P 1l = C a . Segment l will have the upper bound , where is such that C( ) = C a . Shifting any positive weight of the distribution f (q) towards q generates a new distribution function f (q). The distribution f (q) must have a higher expected cost for the entire market than before so C a > C a , but this implies that > since C(q) is strictly increasing, where is the results maximizing category break given f (q).
The change in the advantaged …rm's pro…ts depends on whether the increase in the price charged to segment l out weighs the loss in pro…ts from consumers that are moved from segment l due to the shift from F (q) to F (q). If the shift of weight occurs purely in segment h, the segmenting strategies become more pro…table.
Welfare Implications
The following analysis focuses on welfare in the short-run. Two benchmarks are used to consider the welfare e¤ects of segmentation strategies: no segmentation and symmetric segmentation. For the no segmentation scenario, P im = C a 8i 2 I and 8m 2 M . In the compulsory case, segmentation has no impact on the members of market segment l since P 1l = C a , which is the competitive price for the entire market in the absence of segmentation. However, those in segment h will pay an increased rate, P h = C h > C a , for the same amount of coverage that they would have received at a price of P 1h = C a without segmentation. For any consumer q purchasing insurance, individual welfare is given by V ( q ; W; L) = U (W P h ). It follows that utility at segmentation prices is reduced in segment h, and thus are unequivocally worse o¤ since:
Furthermore, if the purchase of insurance is non-compulsory, prices and consumption in segment l will remain unchanged. However, in segment h, consumers with a loss probability greater than q h , will purchase insurance at the elevated rate and su¤er a welfare loss as in the compulsory case. Also, any consumer q 2 h, with a loss probability, q : q h > q > , will choose not to buy insurance at the elevated market price, P h = C h (P). As a result, both consumer surplus and total surplus fall.
For the symmetric categorization benchmark, the equilibrium price for each segment is its competitive price. Symmetric categorization leads to marginal cost pricing in all segments. Although consumers in segment h face the same price under segmentation and the benchmark case, those categorized in segment l are worse o¤ under asymmetric segmentation. Regardless of the benchmark, some consumers are worse o¤ under the asymmetric segmentation of the market.
Long-run welfare depends on the rate at which new methods of categorizing consumers di¤use throughout the market. The symmetric categorization benchmark shows that innovation in rating variables improves the accuracy with which prices re ‡ect the cost of insurance. Several implications follow from the literature. As detailed in Hoy(1984) categorization may resolve the existence of equilibrium concerns raised in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1977) and under certain conditions enhances welfare. Crocker and Snow(1986) and Bond and Crocker(1991) show, though not explicitly modeled here, categorization can increase e¢ ciency by improving incentives for consumers of insurance.
Empirical Evidence
The model yields several testable results that are indicative of the e¤ective use of segmentation strategies. Two results, those concerning the loss ratio and market share, are tested against a data set that provides the …rst opportunity to measure segmentation used by …rms. The data also provide the opportunity to examine the importance of competition in quantity relative to competition in categorization in PPA insurance markets. The model's implications concerning prices, relative price levels and patterns of price dispersion, are beyond the scope of this paper. 9 
The Data
This unique panel data set spans the years 1999-2005 and is constructed from two sources. Data concerning premiums, losses, and other variables measuring the …nancial position of insurance companies come from NAIC annual statements. Data measuring prices, segmentation, and rating variables were collected by hand from rate and rule …lings. Washington is a "prior approval"state, regulations require insurers to …le proposed rates and receive approval from the Washington O¢ ce of the Insurance Commissioner before the rates can be used. In total, the rate and rule …lings consist of over 150,000 pages of …rm level data and provide a complete record for 68 insurance companies. 10 Firm liability rate algorithms are used as the basis for the relative segmentation measure constructed from the …lings. Liability insurance consists of two coverages: Bodily Injury and Property Damage. Rates are calculated by coverage, adjusting a base rate by rating variable factors, where rating variables, e.g., driving record, marital status, and garaging address, are observable char- 9 Shaver (2011) provides evidence of price levels and price dispersion that is consistent with the model's predictions.
1 0 Due to entry and exit those 68 companies make up an unbalanced panel. Any observation where a company failed to write and to earn $100,000,000 in annual premiums was dropped from the sample. Besides not being active players in the market (this corresponds to a low policy count), with premium levels below the cuto¤ one large loss or a reserve decrease can signi…cantly distort a …rm's loss ratio, and present a signi…cant outlier problem. Multiple lower bound premuim levels were considered and the results are robust to most of the levels tested.
acteristics used by …rms to categorize consumers. 11 The …nal policy premium is the summation of the factor adjusted coverage base rates.
Segmentation is measured by the total number of e¤ective categories, i.e., categories de…ned by a …rm that correspond to price di¤erentials. The number of categories de…ned by …rms is calculated for a broad range of risk characteristics, which are based on the set of characteristics used by …rms in the market, creating a measure that is comparable across all …rms. 12 Given that the predictive power of the underling rating variables is unobservable, the measure serves as a proxy for the categorization advantage described in the model. The number of categories de…ned by a …rm is summed for each rating variable. The measure of total segmentation is the product of the number of categories for each of the rating variable used in the …rm's rating algorithm. Since the total number of categories de…ned by the …rm often changes several times a year, a day weighted average of total annual segmentation is calculated for each …rm in the market.
Converting total segmentation into rankings is critical to measuring the impact of segmentation strategies even though some variation segmentation is lost. The strategic value of segmentation is not conferred by the total number of categories but rather by the ability to segment more …nely relative to one's competitors. The segmentation in the Washington market is constantly expanding so a total measure fails to capture segmentation advantage, e.g., the segmentation level needed to achieve the 75 th percentile of level of segmentation in 1999 falls to the 43 rd percentile in 2005; two very di¤erent strategic positions. An annual measure of relative segmentation (where 1 denotes the greatest level of segmentation) is generated by ranking all …rms that were active during that year according total segmentation.
The control variables originate from both data sources. Each control can be classi…ed in one of three general categories: liability market, physical damage market, and company characteristics. Liability market controls include the average base rate level for liability coverage, the number of liability insurance limits made available to consumers by …rms, …rm defense and containment costs, the commission rate paid to insurance agents, and the percent of earned premiums by the company that is returned to consumers as dividends. Dummy variables indicating the submarkets in which a company writes business are included. 13 While the focus here is on the non-standard market, companies that write in multiple submarkets might di¤er systematically from those that target only one submarket.
14 Physical damage market controls are meant to address the impact of complementary coverages, comprehensive and collision, which are often 1 1 For example, marital status is often used as a rating variable. A multiplicative rating factor of 1.15 could be assigned to increase the base rate by 15% if the consumer is single. 1 2 To ensure a balanced comparison of categorization across …rms, segmentation was calculated for the following risk characteristic ranges: Driver ages 16-90, gender, marital status, 2 cars, 3 drivers, model year/vehicle age up to 11 years. Also driver violation levels ranged from a clean record to one with 1 At-fault accident, 1 DWI, and 2 speeding tickets. 1 3 PPA insurance markets are traditionally divided by underwriting criteria into three submarkets: preferred, standard, and non-standard. 1 4 The average base liability rate level is calculated by averaging the liability base rates from 4 zipcodes that range from urban, suburban, town, and rural.
sold with liability coverages. The controls included are the average physical damage base rate and the number of physical damage coverage limits o¤ered. The remaining control variables capture company level characteristics including total insurance group advertising expenditure, expense ratio, Kenny capacity (a measure of …nancial health for insurance …rms), and the amount of homeowners premiums earned by the company during the year.
OLS Estimation
A partial reduced form approach is used to test the impact of a segmentation advantage on a …rm's loss ratio and market share. The following pooled OLS regression is estimated:
is the segmentation ranking of …rm i relative to all other …rms in year t. X it is a vector of control variables. The square of SEGRN K it is introduced to allow for nonlinearities in the impact of a …rm's segmentation ranking such as variation in the power of rating variables used and the magnitude of gaps in the level of categorization between competitors. Y it denotes each of the two dependent variables used. First, LR it , the pure loss ratio, is used to test the degree to which …rms are able to price above cost. The joint e¤ect of the segmentation variables on LR it should be positive (as a …rm's ability to segment the market relative to its competitors decreases as its ranking value and loss ratio both increase). Second, M S it , the percent of total liability insurance premiums earned, is used to test whether segmentation ranking is negatively related to market share (as a …rm's relative segmentation level falls, its ranking value increases and its market share decreases).
Given the reduced form approach and the potential for endogeneity problems, Table A1 provides the results in a stepwise approach to show that the coe¢ cients of interest are robust to many potential biasing factors including variation in model speci…cation. 15 In Table A1 , regressions (1) and (5) have the expected signs for the joint e¤ect of segmentation rank, though neither coe¢ cient is statistically signi…cant. Regressions (2) and (6) add controls for the liability market factors and introducing time dummy variables, all of the relative segmentation coe¢ cients have the expected sign. Time dummy variables are included to control for the impact of exogenous shocks and the cyclical nature of insurance markets an make no signi…cant change to the results. The loss ratio regression is signi…cant at the 10% level while the market share regression segmentation coe¢ cients remain statistically insigni…cant. Equations (3), (4), (7) and (8) include all controls and vary the use of time dummy variables. The coe¢ cients of the segmentation variables have the expected signs but are not jointly statistically signi…cant. Finally, the coe¢ cients for both the base rate and insurance limits are signi…cant of a magnitude that is consistent with the Rothschild and Stiglitz insurance market model.
Fixed E¤ects Estimation
The OLS regression results su¤er from signi…cant endogeneity problems, in particular the omission of several variables that in ‡uence a …rm's ability to segment the market: claims policy, underwriting standards, method of distribution, and …rm reputation. 16 For example, a …rm's claims policy and underwriting standards will negatively bias OLS estimates of the relationship between segmentation and its loss ratio. In general, insurance …rm's claims policies are relatively constant, but they are likely to vary across …rms. Other things equal, the more strict a …rm's claims policy (meaning the less it tends to pay to insured's that …le claims), the less aggressive it needs to be in segmenting the market. Similarly, underwriting standards, which are criteria used to screen consumers before they are categorized and priced, vary across …rms and are likely to be correlated segmentation. The more restrictive a …rm is in who it will consider insuring, the less the …rm needs to be able to price and categorize relative to its competitors for any given loss ratio. The remaining omitted variables are also likely to cause an OLS approach to underestimate the impact of segmentation.
Assuming that the unobserved factors are constant over the years spanned by the data set, a …xed e¤ects equation is estimated:
Both insurance group and company …xed e¤ects speci…cations were estimated. The company level results are presented in Table A2 . 17 18 Variables denoting the submarkets served, dividends paid, and the amount of homeowners insurance that a …rm writes are dropped due to limited variability.
For the loss ratio regressions, the segmentation ranking variables have the expected sign and are jointly signi…cant regardless of the speci…cation. 19 The signs of the control variables are consistent with expectations. Consider the full regression model (4) From Table A2 . The coe¢ cients on the segmentation ranking variables indicate that segmenting the market better than one's competitors creates a signi…cant advantage. The coe¢ cient of .99 indicates that for a …rm with a relatively high ability to segment, moving up one level in the rank will decrease its losses by nearly one cent per premium dollar earned. From equation (4), if a …rm improves its segmentation rank by 5 places, it can expect to see its loss ratio decrease by about 5 c / . Given that the average …rm's loss ratio in the sample is 67.6, a 5 c / decrease in results in a 7.5% decrease in claims costs (the nonlinear term reduces this e¤ect for the lowest ranked …rms in the sample). For the …rms utilizing very low levels of segmentation, the estimates indicate that improvements in segmentation increase a …rm's loss ratio. One 1 6 RESET tests, run on OLS equations (4) and (8) , con…rm the presence of omitted variables. 1 7 The group level …xed e¤ects are not presented since company e¤ects should capture all of the group level e¤ects plus additional company speci…c factors. 1 8 Hausman test results reject the use of a random e¤ects in favor of a …xed e¤ects approach. 1 9 Given that the data may not be independent across observations, in particular for insurance companies that are members of the same insurance group, cluster errors were used which produced similar results. explanation for this is that the low segmenting …rms previously served a niche that protected them from the competition of more advanced …rms. As they expand, their segmentation strategy is insu¢ cient for the market outside of their niche. Inspection of the data also suggests that small niche insurers rely on weak rating variables, expansion while depending on these variables alone is another potential explanation for this result.
Two additional aspects of the results are interesting to note. First, contrary to the Rothschild and Stiglitz result and the OLS estimates, the insurance limits are no longer statistically signi…cant. This suggests that the quantity dimension, while under the …rms'control, is not an important dimension of competition in PPA markets. Second, the results are consistent with the expectation that the omitted variables led to a negative bias on OLS estimates of the impact of segmentation.
The market share regressions are consistent with respect to sign except for the least segmenting …rms. The full speci…cation, regression (8) , shows that the joint signi…cance of the segmentation variables is at the 5% level. A …rm's market share tends to increase as its relative market segmentation improves. The decrease in market share as a …rm's ranking drops is reasonably large considering that nearly half of …rms in the market have market shares below 1%. As with the loss ratio results, the in ‡ection point occurs near the bottom of the observed range indicating that for the lowest ranked …rms the results are reversed. However, these estimates should be considered a lower bound for the impact on market share since they likely underestimate the impact of segmentation. Since policy level data are not available, market shares are presented in a premium weighted sum for each …rm. The result derived in the model measures market share in terms of the number of policies sold. Given the model's implication that average price set by advantaged …rms is lower than that of disadvantaged …rms, the price weighted market share measure will tend to understate the market share of advantaged …rms and overstate the market share of disadvantaged …rms.
Conclusion
Contrary to the position of Joskow and McLaughlin (1991) and Buzzacchi and Valletti (2005) , that signi…cant market power is not present in PPA insurance markets, this paper models the potential for segmentation strategies to generate market power in insurance markets and provides evidence consistent with their e¤ective use. Rather than focusing on competition in prices and quantities, the model analyzes competition along the dimensions of pricing and categorization …nding both to be signi…cant features of competition. It is shown that a pure strategy SPNE exists and that a categorization advantage generates the ability for the advantaged …rm to price above cost. The model predicts that market power generated through segmentation strategies leads to systematic variation across …rms in the categorization of consumers, price level, and the mix of business. Several testable implications follow. First, an advantaged …rm's ability to segment the market beyond that of its competitors should result in a decline in its loss ratio, an increase in its market share, and a lower average rate level. Second, within pricing categories de…ned more broadly by disadvantaged competitors, price dispersion should decline as the expected cost of consumers increases along the dimension of segmentation advantage. Third, within pricing categories de…ned more broadly by disadvantaged competitors, a …rm with a segmenting advantage should systematically be in the low end of the price distribution for categories of consumers considered to be low risk along the dimension of segmentation, while pricing comparably to competitors in higher risk categories.
Regression results indicate that data from the non-standard Washington PPA liability market are consistent with the model regarding the relationship between relative segmentation and loss ratios and market share. Future research needs to focus on improving measures of segmentation, modeling the effect of segmentation strategies multidimensional cost environments, and testing for segmentation strategies in markets beyond PPA liability insurance market as many insurance markets exhibit price dispersion and variation in categorization indicative of segmentation strategies.
Segmentation strategies raise questions concerning the e¢ ciency of insurance markets. What level of segmentation is desirable in an insurance market? A maintained segmentation advantage leads to an unambiguous welfare loss for consumers. However, improved categorization can reduced subsidization between consumers of di¤erent risk levels, and when widely adopted improve incentives for consumers of insurance with respect to risky behavior. Thus the level of innovation and the subsequent rate of di¤usion of new categorization schemes is an important aspect of the performance of insurance markets that needs further study. Pro…ts from segmentation strategies may be viewed as a return to innovation that reduces the subsidization of risky behavior. However, if segmentation strategies fail to generate a reasonable return to innovation due to rapid competitor adoption, regulators may need to stimulate innovation in the pricing of insurance risks by o¤ering limited exclusive rights to innovators.
Appendix

Proofs
Theorem 1 Given an exogenously set category break 2 (0; q), a pure strategy Subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium exists where the path of play consists of the strategy portfolio P = [( ; C a ; C h ); (C h ; C h ); (C h ; C h )] and the endogenous sharing rule s (P ) = Proof. The strategy of this proof is simply to establish through backward induction that an equilibrium exists in each proper subgame and then to compare the payo¤s to …rm 1 over all the proper subgames to determine its optimal strategy and the path of play, P . It is easiest to proceed by partitioning the set of subgames, [ r n ( ) to be a partition of …rm 1's strategy space, illustrated in Figure 6 .
The vertical axis indicates the price set by the advantaged …rm for the low cost market in stage 1. The horizontal axis indicates the price set by the ad-vantaged …rm for the high cost market in the stage 1. The following presents a strategy and sharing rule for every subgame by partition.
Consider the following partitions of the set of subgames:
1. For any subgame in partition r = fP 1 j P 1 2 [0; q] (C a ; 1) (C a ; 1)g, an equilibrium strategy for …rm i, i = 2; 3, is given by the sharing rule s = and P i = (C a ; C a ). This follows directly from the standard Bertrand price competition result, with constant marginal cost C a for both disadvantaged …rms (2 and 3).
For any subgame in partition r
an equilibrium is given by the strategy P i = (C l ; C l ) for …rm i, i = 2; 3 and the sharing rule s = Consider alternative strategies, clearly if …rm i lowered its price by some > 0 such that P i > P 1h , it would capture all of market l at a loss, i < 0. Further reductions in P i would lead only to greater losses from decreasing revenue in market l and the potential to capture business from market h where …rm i would be inadequately priced. Alternatively, any increase in P i from P i = (C l ; C l ) implies i = 0 and M S i = 0. Thus C L is the optimal strategy for …rm i. and the strategy P i = (C h ; C h ) for i = 2; 3, constitute an equilibrium where the results are i = 0 and M S i 0. Consider the alternatives, clearly market share can never be pro…tably held by a disadvantaged …rm in market l when …rm 1 prices it below C l . Thus, we only need to focus on potential pro…ts from market h. Two cases must be considered (a) P 1h C h : Firm i will price at cost C h by the standard Bertrand price competition argument. Thus P i is an equilibrium price and the corresponding results are i = 0 and M S i > 0.
(b) P 1h < C h : The disadvantaged …rms cannot pro…tably charge a price that ties or undercuts …rm 1 in either of the markets since P 1l < C l and P 1h < C h . Thus any price greater than P 1h (including P ih ) yields the results i = 0 and M S i = 0 and is an equilibrium price.
For partition
C a ]g, the sharing rule s = (1; 0; 0) and the strategy P i = (P 1h ; P 1h ) for …rm i = 2; 3 is an equilibrium. For …rm i, the strategy of P i implies that i = (P i C l ) D il 0 and M S i 0. For any strategy P i , where P i > P i , …rm i is priced out of the market and so earns results of i = 0 and M S i = 0. Suppose that …rm i's strategy is price P i , where P i > P i , then min(P 1l ; P 1h ; P j ) > P i . Consequently …rm i will capture the entire market at a price below C a , which implies i < 0. and strategy P i = (C h ; C h ) for …rm i, i = 2; 3, is an equilibrium. The strategy of P i yields the results i = 0 and M S i 0. For any P i > P i …rm i is priced out of the market so pro…ts and market share are trivially zero. Suppose …rm i were to charge a price lower than P i . For any P i : C h > P i > P 1h , again …rm i is priced out of the market so i = 0 and M S i = 0. For any P i : P 1h P i > P 1l , i's pro…ts are i = (P i C h ) D ih < 0 and for any P i : P 1l P i 0, i's pro…ts are
For partition r
So every strategy from both intervals yields negative pro…ts.
For any subgame in partition r
the sharing rule s = and the strategy P i = (C h ; C h ) for …rm i, i = 2; 3, is an equilibrium. Two cases need to be considered for this partition:
(a) P 1h C h : For …rm i, charging P i implies that i = 0 and M S i > 0. Suppose …rm i, were to charge any price P i > P i , it would be undercut by …rm j, yielding the results i = 0 and M S i = 0. To charge a lower price implies negative pro…ts. For any P i : C h P i > P 1l , i captures market h but is inadequately priced and so pro…ts are
(b) C h > P ih > C a : Clearly for …rm i, charging any P i > P 1h implies that i = 0 and M S i = 0. This applies to P i since P i = C h > P 1h . Furthermore, for any P i : P 1h P i > P 1l , i captures market share in h but is inadequately priced and so pro…ts are i = (P i C h ) D ih < 0. And for any P i :
Finally, to show that P is the path of play for the SPNE it must be clear that …rm 1 maximizes pro…ts by setting the price (selecting the subgame) P 1 = ( ; C a ; C h ) given the sharing rule s = . Since is exogenously set, …rm 1's results from playing P 1 are:
Now consider the maximum payo¤ …rm 1 could expect from each of the partitioned sets of subgames:
1. 1 = 0 for all subgames in partition r since both disadvantaged …rms undercut its price in both markets.
2. For partition r , given that P 2 = P 3 = (C l ; C l ), …rm 1's results yield a negative pro…t in all subgames since P 1l > C l and P 1h < C l . Thus …rm 1 sells nothing in market l and captures market h at some price P 1h : C h > C l > P 1h , but the break even price in market h is P 1h = C h , so 1 < 0.
3. For partition r , consider market l, P 2 = P 3 = C h but for this set of subgames …rm 1's maximum price P 1l : C h > C l > P 1l . So …rm 1 will capture all of this market at a loss in each subgame. For market h, …rm 1's competitors price at the breakeven price. Clearly the best case for market h is to price at the break even price and capture some of the market at cost. Thus,
4. Firm 1 will always serve market h in its entirety at a price below or even to the breakeven price, C h , for all subgames in partition r given P i = (P 1h ; P 1h ) and the sharing rule s = (1; 0; 0). For market l, any price …rm 1 sets above C a will be undercut by the disadvantaged …rms. Thus the greatest results possible in this partition of prices is P 1l = P 1h = C a , which implies that 1 = 0 and M S 1 = 1. All other subgames lead to negative pro…ts or zero pro…ts with less market share.
5. For partition r " , there is no true pro…t maximizing subgame in this partition due to the problem of maximizing on an open set. For market h, P 1h = C h gives the optimal result of tying with the competing …rms at the breakeven price. In market l, pro…ts strictly increases as P 1l approaches C a and market share remains constant. So for any arbitrarily small > 0, let
6. For partition r , given that …rm i plays P i = (C h ; C h ) for any prices set by …rm 1 and P 1l is …xed at C a , the goal is to …nd the optimal P 1h . Consider the pro…t function over the subgames
Clearly for any P 1h C h , pro…ts increase as P 1h increases. At P 1h = C h ,
It is easy to see that any further price increases lead to no changes in pro…ts; however this is not the case for market share.
> 0 for any P 1h C h , however for any P 1h such that P 1h > C h , M S 1 = q , which is strictly less. Thus given the payo¤ function R 1 , the optimal set of prices/subgame for …rm 1 in this partition is, P 1 = ( ; C a ; C h ), the path of play for the subgame equilibrium.
Theorem 2 There exists a results maximizing category break for any cost function C : [0; q] ! R + . If C(q) is such that the set fq j q 2 [0; q] and C(q) = C a g is nonempty, de…ning to be the closure of , then the results maximizing category break is , where = sup( ). If C : [0; q] ! R + is discontinuous such that there exists no consumer q where C(q) = C a , then that point of discontinuity is the results maximizing category break.
Proof. Consider a cost function C(q) that is continuous and weakly increasing over the its domain [0; q]. It follows that must be nonempty. Theorem 1 ensures that an equilibrium exists for each 2 (0; q), so it must be shown that there exists a results maximizing category break and that it is the greatest element of . First consider the payo¤ that follows from any 2 relative to that of any = 2 . De…ne l 2 f j = 2 and < inf( )g and h 2 f j = 2 and > sup( )g . Consider the equilibrium payo¤s to …rm 1 if it selects a categorical break 2 . By theorem 1 the SPNE path of play for any is P = [( ; C a ; C h ); (C h ; C h ); (C h ; C h )] with the endogenous sharing rule s = . Consequently the pro…ts earned by …rm 1
> 0. Now consider the equilibrium payo¤s to …rm 1 if it selects some categorical break l . The expected marginal cost of insuring additional consumers q 2 ( l ; inf( )) must be strictly less than P 1l = C a and so can be pro…tably priced in market l by increasing the category break to include them. Thus, no l can be a pro…t maximizing categorical break choice. Consider the equilibrium payo¤s to …rm 1 if it selects any categorical break h . The expected marginal cost of insuring additional consumers q 2 (sup( ); h ) must be strictly greater than P 1l = C a and cannot be pro…tably priced in market l. So, no h is a pro…t maximizing category choice. Thus, if a payo¤ maximizing category break exists, 2 . If the function C(q) is strictly increasing over the range where C(q) = C a then has one element, = sup( ) which maximizes the …rm's results. If C(q) is continuous but weakly increasing, is nonempty, single valued, and C(q ) = C a ; if C(q) is strictly increasing in a neighborhood of q .
If C(q) is constant over a range such that consists of an interval, many points could potentially serve as categorical breaks when considering pro…ts alone. However, to maximize the advantaged …rm's results function the optimal categorical break must be = sup( ). For consider any other element of as a categorical break. Clearly, the inclusion of consumers with the expected cost C a will not reduce expected pro…ts in market l since in the optimal case …rm 1 will set the price at P 1l = C a . So decreasing the break from = sup( ) by some > 0 will not alter …rm 1's pro…ts. But, market share shifts due to the fact that the advantaged …rm captures all of market segment l and splits segment h with at least one competitor. Hence, the results maximizing advantaged …rm will select = sup( ). Finally, consider the case where there is a discontinuity in C(q) such that = ?. Since the distribution is non-atomistic the point at which the discontinuity occurs is , this follows from an argument similar to that made in the continuous case.
Theorem 3 For any exogenously set
2 (0; q). A pure strategy Subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium exists where the path of play consists of the strategy portfolio P = [( ; C a ; C h (P)); (C h (P); C h (P)); (C h (P); C h (P))] and the endogenous sharing rule s (P ) =
, where C h (P) is the expected cost of insuring an individual drawn at random from the insureds that remain in the high cost market at the price P h = C h (P).
Proof. This proof follows the same strategy as the proof of theorem 1. The key di¤erence is shorthand convention used to denote any expected cost for a market segment where all consumers categorized in a market segment purchase insurance given the price level. Consider the following partitions of subgames:
1. For any subgame in partition r = fP 1 j P 1 2 [0; q] (C a ; 1) (C a ; 1)g, an equilibrium strategy for …rm i, i = 2; 3, is given by the sharing rule s = and P i = (C a ; C a ). This follows directly from the standard Bertrand price competition result, with constant marginal cost C a for both disadvantaged …rms.
For any subgame in partition r
an equilibrium is given by the strategy P i = (C l ; C l ) for …rm i, i = 2; 3 and the sharing rule s = . Consider alternative strategies, clearly if …rm i lowered its price by some > 0 such that P i > P 1h , it would capture all of market l at a loss, i < 0. Further reductions in P i would lead only to greater losses from decreasing revenue in market l and the potential to capture business from market h where …rm i would be inadequately priced. Alternatively, any increase in P i from P i = (C l ; C l ) implies i = 0 and M S i = 0. Thus C l is the optimal strategy for …rm i. and the strategy P i = (C h (P); C h (P)) for i = 2; 3, constitute an equilibrium where the results are i = 0 and M S i 0. Consider the alternatives, clearly market share can never be pro…tably held by a disadvantaged …rm in market l when …rm 1 prices it below C l , thus we only need to focus on potential pro…ts from market h. Two cases must be considered:
C h (P): Firm i will price at cost C h (P) by the standard Bertrand price competition argument. If all consumers in segment h purchase insurance at a price of P h = C h = C h (P) where d h (P) = h. If some q 2 h and have choke prices below C h , then as they drop out of the market the expected cost of insuring an individual from market h increases as those who exit must be lower cost than those that remain. There always exists a stable price/quantity insured for market h, as the highest risk individual in the market, C, will always purchase insurance at the price P h = C(C). Thus the actuarially fair price will exist at some P h = C h (P) > C h , where C h (P) : C C h (P) C h . Thus P i is an equilibrium price and the corresponding results are
The disadvantaged …rms cannot pro…tably charge a price that ties or undercuts …rm 1 in either of the markets since P 1l < C l and P 1h < C h (P). Thus any price greater than P 1h (including P ih ) yields the results i = 0 and M S i = 0 and is an equilibrium price.
For partition
C a ]g, the sharing rule s = (1; 0; 0) and the strategy P i = (P 1h ; P 1h ) for …rm i = 2; 3 is an equilibrium. For …rm i, the strategy of P i implies that i = (P i C l ) D il 0 and M S i 0. For any strategy P i , where P i > P i , …rm i is priced out of the market and so earns results of i = 0 and M S i = 0. Suppose that …rm i's strategy is price P i , where P i > P i , then min(P 1l ; P 1h ; P j ) > P i . Firm i captures the entire market at a price below C a , which implies i < 0.
For partition r
; C a ) (P 1l ; 1)g, the sharing rule s = and strategy P i = (C h (P); C h (P)) for …rm i, i = 2; 3, is an equilibrium. The strategy of P i yields the results i = 0 and M S i 0, where market share depends on the level of P 1h . For any P i > P i …rm i is priced out of the market so pro…ts and market share are trivially zero. Suppose …rm i were to charge a price lower than P i . For any P i : C h (P) > P i > P 1h , again …rm i is priced out of the market so i = 0 and M S i = 0. For any P i : P 1h P i > P 1l , i's pro…ts are i = (P i C h (P)) D ih < 0 and for any P i :
So every strategy from both intervals yields negative pro…ts. and the strategy P i = (C h (P); C h (P)) for …rm i, i = 2; 3, is an equilibrium. Two cases need to be considered for this partition:
(a) P 1h C h (P): For …rm i, charging P i implies that i = 0 and M S i > 0. Suppose …rm i, were to charge any price P i > P i , it would be undercut by …rm j, yielding the results i = 0 and M S i = 0. To charge a lower price implies negative pro…ts. For any P i : C h (P) P i > P 1l , i captures market h but is inadequately priced and so pro…ts are i = (P i C h (P)) D ih < 0. And for any P i : P 1l
Clearly for …rm i, charging any P i > P 1h implies that i = 0 and M S i = 0. This applies to P i since P i = C h (P) > P 1h . Furthermore, for any P i : P 1h P i > P 1l , i captures market share in h but is inadequately priced and so pro…ts are i = (P i C h (P)) D ih < 0. And for any P i : P 1l P i 0, i's pro…ts are
Finally, to show that P is the path of play for the SPNE it must be clear that …rm 1 maximizes pro…ts by setting P 1 = ( ; C a ; C h (P)) given the sharing rule s = . Since is exogenously set, …rm 1's results from playing P 1 are:
2. For partition r , given that P 2 = P 3 = (C l ; C l ), …rm 1's results yield a negative pro…t in all subgames since P 1l > C l and P 1h < C l . Firm 1 sells nothing in market l and captures market segment h at some price
3. For partition r , consider market l, P 2 = P 3 = C h (P) but for this set of subgames …rm 1's maximum price P 1l : C h (P) > C l > P 1l . So …rm 1 will capture all of this market at a loss in each subgame. For market h, …rm 1's competitors price at the breakeven price, P ih = C h (P). Clearly the best case for market h is to price at the break even price and gain some of the market at cost. Thus,
4. Firm 1 will always serve market h in its entirety at a price below or even to the breakeven price, C h (P), for all subgames in partition r with P i = (P 1h ; P 1h ) and the sharing rule s = (1; 0; 0). For market l, any price …rm 1 sets above C a will be undercut by the disadvantaged …rms. Thus the greatest results possible in this partition of prices is P 1l = P 1h = C a , which implies that 1 = 0 and M S 1 = 1. It is easy to see that all other subgames lead to negative pro…ts or zero pro…ts with less market share.
5. For partition r " , there is no true pro…t maximizing subgame in this partition due to the problem of maximizing on an open set. For market h, P 1h = C h (P) gives the optimal result of tying with the competing …rms at the breakeven price. In market l, pro…ts strictly increases as P 1l approaches C a and market share remains constant. So for any arbitrarily small > 0, let
6. For partition r , given that …rm i plays P i = (C h (P); C h (P)) for any prices set by …rm 1 and P 1l is …xed at C a , the goal is to …nd the optimal P 1h . Consider the pro…t function over the subgames 1 = (C a C l ) + (P 1h C h (P)) D 1h . Clearly for any P 1h C h (P), pro…ts increase as P 1h
It is easy to see that any further price increases lead to no change in pro…ts; however this is not the case for market share. M S 1 = + 1 3 q h P m2M qm > 0 for any P 1h C h (P), however for any P 1h such that P 1h > C h (P), M S 1 = P m2M qm , which is strictly less. Thus given the payo¤ function R 1 , the optimal set of prices/subgame for …rm 1 in this partition is, P 1 = ( ; C a ; C h (P)), the path of play for the subgame equilibrium 
Regression Results
Segmentation Ranking
The day weighted average number of effective categories used during the year.
Loss Ratio
The pure loss ratio defined as losses incurred divided by premiums earned. Physical Damage Limits The number ofPhysical Damage limit combinations the insurance company offers to consumers.
Market
Expense Ratio
The percentage of premium used to pay the costs of acquiring, writing, and servicing insurance, calculated on a statutory basis.
Producer Surplus
The Percent change in Policyholder Surplus.
Advertising
Total dollars spent by the insurance group with which the company is associated.
Group Homeowners Total Homeowners premium dollars earned by the insurance group with which the company is associated.
Group Earned Premium
Total premium dollars earned by the insurance group with which the company is associated. 
